CIAO DATE: 02/2012
Volume: 3, Issue: 1
December 2011
Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis (PDF)
David Ucko
Counterinsurgency theory, once celebrated as having pulled Iraq back from the brink, is now in crisis due to its record in Afghanistan. Considering both the contribution of counterinsurgency theory to military thinking and its limitations as a concept, it remains valuable, even if the term "counterinsurgency theory" once again is cast aside. The theory provides not a strategy or campaign plan but rather a collection of insights and principles. The value of the theory depends on what is expected from it. Some insights based on counterinsurgency theory appear commonsensical but nonetheless challenge dominant misconceptions about the nature of war. The lessons of recent counterinsurgency campaigns must therefore be retained for future military interventions—and prompt greater caution among military strategists and policymakers about such undertakings. Careful study and research are needed to determine how best to apply this theory to future operations, and it is fair to say that it is better at raising the right questions than in providing the answers.
Negotiating Afghanistan: When? With Whom? About What? (PDF)
Thomas Pickering
The Barack Obama administration's policy on Afghanistan negotiations differs from that of its predecessor in that it is open to greater debate of prospects and issues, and it senses that an effort at the proper time might have a useful and positive impact. In parallel with the efforts by former Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, a study was conducted under the leadership of former Algerian Foreign Minister and United Nations Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and co-chaired by the author of this article. This study, sponsored by the Century Foundation think tank, sought to answer these main questions about negotiations in Afghanistan: should negotiations be undertaken, and if so, when? What should be the scope of the problems to be resolved? How should the process be started, maintained, and concluded? Also examined were the questions of who should lead and participate, and how these delicate relationships among parties should be addressed. The study concluded that negotiations must be part of an overall U.S. strategy of stabilization for Afghanistan. Furthermore, U.S. leadership in the negotiation process is essential, with Pakistan and other regional neighbors as key participants. Getting negotiations started, which may be best accomplished with a facilitator, could be as difficult as keeping the process going and bringing it to a useful and successful conclusion. The central issue will be the future governance arrangements for Afghanistan. The time is ripe, the study found, for seeking to negotiate peace and stability in Afghanistan.
The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction (PDF)
Renanah Miles
The mandate of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to lead U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts is marked by an inability to field a viable civilian response capable of managing in the absence of the military leadership or of leading an integrated civil-military team. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) outlines reforms to close this capacity gap. Even if implemented, QDDR reforms are unlikely to be sufficient to address the root problems of bureaucratic rivalries and strained resources or timely enough to ensure a seamless transition in Iraq. DOS and USAID must take calculated steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, corporate cultural, and structural considerations by clarifying roles and responsibilities, clearly defining the mandate, articulating a strategic framework for developing and applying capacity, and demonstrating that capacity. Furthermore, the approach to garner congressional support must be refocused, and together DOS and USAID must improve the case for the mission and the cost of maintaining a standing civilian response capability. Building a robust DOS and USAID capacity for stabilization and reconstruction ultimately will enhance both efficiency and effectiveness, as the skills required largely reside in the civilian arms of foreign affairs.
The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach (PDF)
Brian Burton
The future direction of U.S. strategy against violent transnational terrorist groups abroad is increasingly founded on the "indirect approach," a strategy that emphasizes building partnerships to improve the security and governance capacity of at-risk partner states and reduce the incidence of safe havens for militants in ungoverned spaces. The indirect approach has achieved only relatively modest outcomes. While terrorist groups have been degraded and the tactical capabilities of host-nation militaries have been improved, the lasting defeat of militant organizations has remained elusive. Since the use of the indirect approach is likely to continue, policymakers should have a clear understanding of its limitations. Political strategies to leverage security force assistance are insufficiently emphasized by U.S. policymakers, and this failure undermines the legitimacy of U.S. security assistance. Rigorous assessment of outcomes from efforts to build partner capacity should be more extensively completed and disseminated among military and civilian partners. Finally, policymakers should always be cautious about expansions of American involvement that are linked to open-ended objectives and poorly defined outcomes, lest the small-scale indirect approach spiral into the very type of large-scale direct action that it is intended to avoid.
The Case for Nation-building: Why and How to Fix Failed States (PDF)
Paul Miller
Nation-building has a bad reputation. It is widely seen as an impossible fool's errand that is too expensive for today's constrained budgets. That reputation is wrong. First, nation-building is not international charity. It is a necessary and pragmatic response to failed states that threaten regional stability. Time and time again, history has shown that state failure, when left unaddressed, causes demonstrable harm to neighbors, whole regions, and occasionally the international order itself. Second, nation-building is not doomed to failure: the perception that nation building always fails is due to a few famous cases of dramatic failure. A closer look at the history and practice of nation-building illustrates that the international community has learned key lessons and improved its ability to foster stability and democracy in states confronted with violence, illegitimacy, poverty, and institutional breakdown. Finally, nation-building, while expensive, is relatively cost-effective compared to the alternatives: both isolationism and imperialism would be prohibitively expensive. As U.S. policymakers review budget and force structure in coming years, they should recognize that nation-building is a pragmatic option that can meet the needs of the hour, and it can do so successfully and cost-effectively.
No Marshall Plan for the Middle East (PDF)
Amitai Etzioni
A number of politicians, U.S. military leaders, and academics have called for a Middle East Marshall Plan—a massive, transformative aid program analogous to the one implemented in Europe after World War II. Although the idea is appealing, there is no way to bring anything remotely resembling the Marshall Plan to the Middle East, and attempts to launch one are likely to cause some undesirable side effects. The sociological, cultural, and structural conditions in postwar Europe were favorable for implementing a large-scale aid program; the opposite is true in today's Middle East. Germany had competent government personnel and relatively low levels of corruption, while in many Middle Eastern nations, corruption is endemic and pervasive. Many Middle Eastern states lack the industrial bases, infrastructure, educated populations, and strong support for science and technology, corporations, business, and commerce institutions that were reconstructed in Germany after World War II. Instead of attempting to create a large-scale transformative program, the United States should scale back to less demanding ambitions, focus on security instead of regime change, work to create favorable trade conditions, and allow for humanitarian aid.
Sub-Saharan African Military and Development Activities (PDF)
Birame Diop
After more than 50 years of independence, many African countries face the destabilizing forces of poverty, hunger, and public health crises, which drive insecurity in the form of ethnic-based conflicts, social radicalism, and violent extremism. The public sector in these countries is largely dependent on foreign aid and international security interventions, while the private sector is too stunted to fill the gap to provide needed services or employment. The Sengalese "Armée-Nation" is a model for civil-military collaboration that integrates civilian leadership with the military, providing broadly construed security and advancing economic and social development—without excessive militarization. Many African civilian leaders and the public are cautious to expand the military beyond its traditional role, a well-founded concern in light of the continent's history. Due to the greater strength of military institutions when compared with African public and private sectors and to the military's coercive capability, a high risk exists of the military dominating the civilian realm, exerting undue influence over domestic politics, or executing military control. Yet with sound safeguards—including a legal framework of rule of law and human rights, and a culture of civilian prominence over the military—these risks largely can be minimized.
Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring (PDF)
Kenneth McKenzie Jr., Elizabeth Packard
The reform movements occurring across the Middle East during the "Arab Spring" have highlighted the importance of U.S. Central Command efforts to establish and maintain enduring military-to-military relationships. These relationships provide the United States with unique avenues to build trust with partner nations, address mutual security interests, and support U.S. diplomatic initiatives. The activities that help advance these relationships also serve as a steadying influence—a signal of commitment to our allies—and will remain crucial as the United States seeks to understand and respond to the historic changes occurring in the region. In order to properly respond to the dynamics of the Arab Spring, we must more fully understand them. Toward that end, listening to and learning from our friends and allies in the region are an integral part of this strategy. Relationships facilitated through military-to-military engagements provide a vital channel of communications that allow for the open and honest exchange of ideas as a catalyst for popular participation and change.
Unconventional Challenges and Nontraditional Roles for Armed Forces: The Case for Rwanda (PDF)
Frank Rusagara
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts following the 1994 Rwandan genocide drew on Rwanda's traditional history and values by renewing the Ingando concept of solidarity camps. Through Ingando, the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) has integrated ex-combatants into the national army, as it has spearheaded a culture of tolerance and enlightened nationalism and recaptured a sense of community and social cohesion. First, the ex-combatants and the RDF are guided through the process of unburdening themselves emotionally. Second, former adversaries are redeployed jointly. Third, they engage in exploratory dialogue on why the conflict began and why each reacted to it the way they did, and seek to come to terms with their mutual losses and responsibilities. The final stage is re-evaluating the whole process. Ex-combatants who participated in Ingando began to overcome mutual fear and suspicion and the desire for revenge; heal the wounds of hatred; accept responsibility for the past; and serve as a model of reconciliation for the broader community. The ex-militia and guerrilla army have been integrated into the RDF and received international recognition in peace support operations.
War Comes to Bala Morghab: A Tragedy of Policy and Action in Three Acts (PDF)
John Bessler
The story of the Bala Morghab district of Badghis Province in 2008–2009 reveals lessons derived from the tribulations of the friction of coalition warfare at the tactical and operational levels, the gaps between policy and operations, the contradictions of winning hearts and minds, and the challenges of day-to-day survival. The overall strategy of the International Security Assistance Force was "shape, clear, hold, and build." The Bala Morghab experience demonstrates that the most critical aspect of this strategy in a counterinsurgency environment is shaping—knowing, understanding, and motivating the people who are about to be affected, coupled with promoting local ownership of the process. Not to engage with local leaders well in advance of policy implementation is a recipe for failure. Building trust among the local population in legitimate leaders will itself build capacity and minimize the influence of insurgents. Finally, half-measures of the whole-of-government approach in the absence of unity of purpose will fail. Until the coalition understands how to influence the decisive terrain in the valley, and until the Afghan government addresses the needs of the average citizen in a way that marginalizes the current powerbrokers, there will be little progress.
War Comes to Bala Morghab: A Tragedy of Policy and Action in Three Acts
John Bessler
The story of the Bala Morghab district of Badghis Province in 2008–2009 reveals lessons derived from the tribulations of the friction of coalition warfare at the tactical and operational levels, the gaps between policy and operations, the contradictions of winning hearts and minds, and the challenges of day-to-day survival. The overall strategy of the International Security Assistance Force was "shape, clear, hold, and build." The Bala Morghab experience demonstrates that the most critical aspect of this strategy in a counterinsurgency environment is shaping—knowing, understanding, and motivating the people who are about to be affected, coupled with promoting local ownership of the process. Not to engage with local leaders well in advance of policy implementation is a recipe for failure. Building trust among the local population in legitimate leaders will itself build capacity and minimize the influence of insurgents. Finally, half-measures of the whole-of-government approach in the absence of unity of purpose will fail. Until the coalition understands how to influence the decisive terrain in the valley, and until the Afghan government addresses the needs of the average citizen in a way that marginalizes the current powerbrokers, there will be little progress.
Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military Capacity, 2007–2010
Bradford Baylor, Jeanne Burrington, Bradford Davis, Russell Goehring
Low per capita income is linked to economic instability and state insecurity in postconflict societies. While domestic state capacity is the long-term goal, low-income societies emerging from conflict do not have the luxury to wait. Thus, given the current limitations of state performance, the immediate security solutions for low per capita income countries need to focus on host-government reform policies and alternatives for delivering basic services, rather than long-term state capacity-building. Even with low government capacity, certain economic policies can be put in place to improve per capita income and stimulate employment creation and other public goods. Establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government contribute to security and stability as they also ultimately contribute to building state capacity.
Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security (PDF)
Pauline Baker
Imagine a debate erupting in the United States over how much the government should invest in cancer research. (Such a debate might well emerge from the budget cutting that we are going to face over the next few years.) One school of thought argues that we should continue to fund the research generously because men have about a 1 in 2 chance of developing cancer at some point in their lives, and women have a 1 in 3 chance. Impressive statistics, says the other side, but while millions may contract cancer, the actual number of cancer deaths is estimated to be less than 600,000 in 2011. Millions of Americans may suffer and we should make them comfortable, but cancer is not an existential threat to America. We need not continue funding the search for a cure.